整合模型还是占优启发式模型? 从齐当别模型视角进行的检验
Integrative Model or the Priority Heuristic? A Test from the Point of View of the Equate-to-Differentiate Model
查看参考文献50篇
文摘
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实验从齐当别模型的视角,通过对决策过程反应时的考察分别对以累积预期理论(cumulative prospect theory)为代表的整合模型和启发式模型家族的重要成员--占优启发式模型(priority heuristic)--进行检验.结果表明,决策过程反应时并未随着占优启发式模型所假定的决策步骤的增加而变慢;也未随着选项之间整体值差值的变大而变快;模糊决策过程的反应时反而快于风险决策过程的反应时.无论是以累积预期理论为代表的整合模型还是占优启发式模型均不能满意地描述和解释人们的实际决策过程,而齐当别模型则能解释大部分实验结果.文章建议多角度,多指标探讨人们的决策过程,检验,修改,完善,以及建立新的启发式模型或决策过程模型(process model),以增进对人们如何进行风险决策的理解 |
其他语种文摘
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Theories intended to describe decision making under risk and uncertainty can be classified as two families according to their theoretical basis:the integrative model and heuristic model. The integrative model postulates that the decision maker is both willing and able to combine information from different dimensions through two fundamental processes:weighting and summing. The heuristic model assumes that people do not integrate these kinds of information but rely on a repertoire of simple decision strategies--called heuristics--to make inferences, choices, estimations, and other decisions. A total of four experiments were conducted to compare these two sets of competing models from the view of the equate-to-differentiate model(Li,1994,2004a,2004b) by using a response time approach. Experiment 1 re-examined the priority heuristic by using the decision questions employed by Brandstatter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig(2006), but failed to duplicate their results. The priority heuristic predicted that the increase of reasons(steps) required would be associated with the increase of time for making a choice. Experiment 2 tested the priority heuristic by manipulating the number of reasons(steps) assumed by the priority heuristic and the difference between two options on the best-outcome/worst-outcome dimension assumed by the equate-to-differentiate model. It was revealed that the decision time did not increase with the increasing number of reasons(steps) assumed by the priority heuristic but decreased with the increased difference between two options on the best-outcome/worst-outcome dimension. These results obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 were not friendly to the priority heuristic model. Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to test the integrative model. Experiment 3 tested the integrative model by comparing the decision time under risk and under ambiguity. Interestingly, the average decision time under risk was much longer than that under ambiguity. This was contrary to the implications of the integrative model because integrating an ambiguous probability with a given outcome will take longer time than integrating an exact probability with a given outcome to give an overall value or utility. Experiment 4 tested the integrative model by manipulating the difference between CPT(Cumulative Prospect Theory) values and the difference between two options on the best-outcome/worst-outcome dimension. The results showed that the decision time did not decrease with the increased difference between the CPT values but decreased with the increased difference between two options on the best-outcome/worst-outcome dimension, which were not consistent with integrative model but consistent with the equate-to-differentiate model. In sum, neither integrative model nor priority heuristic could help account for the data on choice process that we observed. Future work may focus on testing these two sets of models by employing methods which can provide a much richer description of the decision process than the response time approach employed in the present paper |
来源
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心理学报
,2010,42(8):821-833 【核心库】
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关键词
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整合模型
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启发式模型
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齐当别模型
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决策过程
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反应时
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地址
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1.
中国科学院心理研究所, 北京, 100101
2.
中山大学逻辑与认知研究所, 广州, 510275
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语种
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中文 |
ISSN
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0439-755X |
学科
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社会科学总论 |
基金
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国家自然科学基金项目
;
北京市重点学科建设等项目资助
;
中国科学院知识创新工程重要方向项目
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文献收藏号
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CSCD:4031277
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