行为代理理论:理论述评与展望
Behavioral agency theory:Theoretical review and future agenda
查看参考文献90篇
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文摘
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代理理论(agency theory,AT)因其简洁性被广泛接受并大量使用,然而AT提出降低代理成本的机制未获一致支持,引发了争议.为解决刚性假设的不足,行为代理理论(behavioral agency theory,BAT)从认知视角对AT中理想化的风险假设做出修正,将治理手段、问题界定与决策相结合.在分析AT降低代理成本机制失效原因后,BAT通过引入个体认知系统地描绘了行为决策的逻辑基础.与此同时,BAT刻画了代理人因面临内部治理和外部因素而承担风险的"内心活动"为战略和治理研究提供了新颖的行为学视角,提高了理论预测性,这尤其适于研究因制度、文化等区别导致的中国公司治理差异.相比于欧美研究,国内学者对该理论关注较少,缺乏系统性理论述评,应用上也存在巨大空白.因此,本文首先梳理了BAT的理论起源并界定了理论核心问题;随后根据理论框架从问题界定、薪酬激励、监督机制、家族企业研究这4个主题进行述评,并理清研究边界;最后,本文提出关于未来研究方向和理论如何配适中国情境的建议,以期为后来研究提供借鉴. |
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其他语种文摘
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Agency Theory (AT) is widely accepted and used for its simplicity.However,the mechanism proposed by AT to reduce agency costs has yet to be unanimously supported,which has led to controversies.To address the rigid assumptions' shortcomings,behavioral agency theory(BAT) revises the idealized risk assumptions in AT from a cognitive perspective by combining governance mechanisms,problem framing,and decision-making.After analyzing the reasons for the failure of the AT mechanism to reduce agency costs,BAT systematically depicts the logical basis of behavioral decision-making by introducing individual cognition.At the same time,BAT's portrays the "inner activities" of agents' risk-taking when facing internal governance and external factors,which provides a novel behavioral perspective for strategy and governance research.BAT also improves theoretical predictability,which is particularly suitable for studying differences in corporate governance in China due to institutional and cultural differences.Compared with European and American studies,domestic scholars have paid less attention to BAT,needing more systematic theoretical reviews and leaving a massive gap in its application.Therefore,this paper first sorts out BAT's origin and defines its core issues.Second,the paper reviews the literature on four topics according to its original theoretical framework:1) how does problem framing affect decision-making cognition,2) whether the incentive alignment is helpful in stimulating agents to take the risk,3) whether monitoring is an effective governance mechanism,and 4) the expansion and application of BAT in the family business research,to clarify the research boundary.Finally,this paper puts forward suggestions on how to adapt the future research direction and theory to the Chinese situation to improve the development prospect of the theory and provide a reference for scholars to deepen their research further. |
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来源
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系统工程理论与实践
,2023,43(8):2321-2337 【核心库】
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DOI
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10.12011/SETP2022-1519
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关键词
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行为代理理论
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公司治理
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战略决策
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风险承担
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理论述评
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地址
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上海财经大学商学院, 上海, 200433
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语种
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中文 |
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文献类型
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综述型 |
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ISSN
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1000-6788 |
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学科
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社会科学总论 |
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基金
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上海财经大学2020年研究生创新基金
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文献收藏号
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CSCD:7569667
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