收益共享的寄售契约下供应商生产成本谎报行为分析
ANALYSIS OF MANUFACTURING COST MISREPORTING BEHAVIOR OF MANUFACTURER UNDER CONSIGNMENT CONTRACT WITH REVENUE SHARING
查看参考文献13篇
文摘
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在收益共享寄售契约下的两级供应链中,供应商向零售商报告其生产成本;零售商根据供应商报告的生产成本,决定零售商的收益分配比例;供应商决定零售价格和生产数量,并且保持产品的所有权。由于信息不对称,供应商可能谎报其生产成本。作者应用博弈论分析了供应商谎报行为对供应链及其成员决策及绩效的影响。利用解析的方法得出一些理论结果:零售价格在信息对称时小于生产成本信息不对称时;订货数量在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时;零售商的利润分配比例在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时。供应商的谎报行为使其自身利润增加,使零售商和供应链的利润减少. |
其他语种文摘
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The two-echelon supply chain under stochastic manufacturing demand has a single component supplier selling to a single manufacturer.The model with perpetual manufacturing demand and many replenishment opportunities is considered by analytic method. The problem can be modeled as a supplier-led Stackelberg dynamic game.Supply chain performances under consignment and non-consignment are considered respectively.The supplier, acting as a designer of supply chain,offers the manufacturer a backorder penalty cost share allocation,and then the manufacturer decides the optimal base stock level.In this paper the following conclusions are obtained.Under consignment,there is a unique equilibrium solution in the game,and the supply chain system is optimal.Under non-consignment,there is a unique equilibrium solution in the game,and the supply chain system is optimal.Supply chain performance under consignment is superior to that under non-consignment. |
来源
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系统科学与数学
,2011,31(1):13-20 【核心库】
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关键词
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谎报
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寄售契约
;
收益共享
;
供应链管理
;
不对称信息
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地址
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1.
沈阳大学工商管理学院, 沈阳, 110004
2.
东北大学, 流程工业综合自动化教育部重点实验室, 沈阳, 110004
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语种
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中文 |
文献类型
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研究性论文 |
ISSN
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1000-0577 |
学科
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社会科学总论 |
基金
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国家自然科学基金国家杰出青年科学基金
;
国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目
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文献收藏号
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CSCD:4420542
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13
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